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—  Sympos ium — 
The Supreme Court’s Treatment 
of Same-Sex Marriage in United 
States v. Windsor and 
Hollingsworth v. Perry: Analysis 
and Implications 
INTRODUCTION 
Jonathan L. Entin† 
For many years, gay rights advocates focused primarily on 
overturning sodomy laws. The Supreme Court initially took a 
skeptical view of those efforts. In 1976, the Court summarily affirmed 
a ruling that upheld Virginia’s sodomy law.1 And a decade later, in 
Bowers v. Hardwick,2 the Court not only rejected a constitutional 
challenge to Georgia’s sodomy law but ridiculed the claim.3 That 
precedent lasted less than two decades before being overruled by 
Lawrence v. Texas.4 
Meanwhile, the effort to secure legal protection for gay rights 
expanded to other issues. For example, in Romer v. Evans,5 the  
†  Associate Dean for Academic Affairs (School of Law), David L. Brennan 
Professor of Law, and Professor of Political Science, Case Western 
Reserve University. 
1. Doe v. Commonwealth’s Att’y, 425 U.S. 901 (1976), aff’g mem. 403 F. 
Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975) (3-judge court). Although this challenge 
failed, it is worth noting that there was a dissenting opinion in the 
district court, see 403 F. Supp. at 1203 (Merhige, J., dissenting), and 
three justices would have set the case for plenary consideration in the 
Supreme Court, see 403 U.S. at 901 (Brennan, Marshall & Stevens, JJ., 
“would note probable jurisdiction and set the case for oral argument”). 
2. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
3. See id. at 194 (“[T]o claim that a right to engage in such conduct is 
‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition’ or ‘implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty’ is, at best, facetious.”); id. at 196 (Burger, 
C.J., concurring) (“Condemnation of [sodomy] is firmly rooted in 
Judaeo-Christian moral and ethical standards.”). 
 The statute at issue in Bowers v. Hardwick later was invalidated for 
violating the right to privacy protected under the state constitution. 
Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 1998). 
4. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
5. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
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Supreme Court struck down a state constitutional amendment that 
repealed all existing laws and policies prohibiting discrimination on 
the basis of sexual orientation because the amendment was based on 
illegitimate animus against an unpopular group.6 
More significantly, same-sex couples began to seek the right to 
marry. They won a preliminary victory in Hawaii, where the state 
supreme court held that a ban on same-sex marriage was subject to 
strict scrutiny.7 Although the Hawaii case was short-circuited by the 
adoption of a constitutional amendment allowing the state to limit 
marriage to opposite-sex couples,8 the prospect that other states and 
the federal government might have to recognize same-sex marriages 
performed in Hawaii prompted Congress to enact the Defense of 
Marriage Act (DOMA) in 1996.9 Some courts, relying on state 
constitutional provisions, did strike down bans on same-sex 
marriages.10 One of those decisions came from California,11 where the 
voters responded by passing Proposition 8 to amend the state 
constitution to limit marriage to opposite-sex couples.12 
Litigation challenging the constitutionality of Proposition 8 and of 
DOMA reached the Supreme Court last term. In Hollingsworth v. 
Perry,13 the Court held that the proponents of the California 
amendment lacked standing to appeal a lower court ruling that struck 
down the Golden State’s ban on same-sex marriage after state officials 
declined to do so.14 In United States v. Windsor,15 the Court held that 
section 3 of DOMA,16 which defines marriage for federal purposes as 
open only to opposite-sex couples, was unconstitutional. Both of these 
 
6. Id. at 632–35. 
7. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 68 (Haw. 1993). 
8. Haw. Const. art. I, § 23 (ratified 1998). 
9. Pub. L. No. 104–199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 and 
28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2012)). More than 30 states also adopted measures 
to limit marriage to opposite-sex couples. E.g., Alaska Const. art. I, 
§ 25; Ariz. Const. art. XXX, § 1; Mich. Const. art. I, § 25; Miss. 
Const. art. 14, § 263A; Mo. Const. art. I, § 33; Nev. Const. art. I, 
§ 21; Ohio Const. art. XV, § 11; Or. Const. art. XV, § 5a; S.C. 
Const. art. XVII, § 15; Tex. Const. art. I, § 32; Utah Const. art. I, 
§ 29; Wis. Const. art. 13, § 13. 
10. E.g., Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999); Goodridge v. Dep’t of 
Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
11. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008). 
12. Cal. Const. art. I, § 7.5 (approved 2008). 
13. 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
14. Id. at 2668. 
15. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
16. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012). 
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decisions were 5–4 rulings, although the votes did not fall along the 
same lines: the majority in Windsor, the DOMA case, consisted of the 
four more liberal justices joined by Justice Kennedy, who wrote the 
opinion, while the four more conservative justices dissented;17 the 
majority in Hollingsworth v. Perry consisted of Chief Justice Roberts 
and Justice Scalia, from the conservative wing, and Justices Ginsburg, 
Breyer, and Kagan from the more liberal side, while the conservative 
Justices Alito and Thomas as well as the liberal Justice Sotomayor 
joined Justice Kennedy’s dissent. 
The divisions within the Supreme Court and the intensity of the 
public debate about same-sex marriage led the editors of the Case 
Western Reserve Law Review to organize a symposium in October 
2013 to discuss the Court’s decisions and their implications. This issue 
contains papers presented at that symposium. Participants included a 
wide range of legal scholars, social scientists, and other commentators. 
Several broad themes pervaded the program: doctrinal matters such 
as the implications of these rulings for federalism and equal 
protection, the role of the judiciary in addressing contentious public 
questions, the nature of the family, and the place of empirical and 
other social-scientific perspectives in legal decision making. 
The papers might profitably be read in groups of two or three, 
although many of the themes identified above appear at many points 
in this issue. The first set of papers illuminates some institutional 
factors raised by the marriage cases. Robert Nagel focuses on Justice 
Kennedy’s approach to federalism in Windsor.18 Professor Nagel 
suggests that the lead opinion’s discussion of federalism does not 
really respect the role of the states despite rhetorical flourishes to the 
contrary. 
Next, Nancy Scherer brings the perspective of political science to 
the analysis of the Windsor decision.19 She applies two models of 
judicial decision making, neither of which seeks to parse constitutional 
text, judicial precedent, or other traditional sources of legal 
interpretation. Instead, she applies the attitudinal model, which seeks 
to predict the votes of Supreme Court justices by focusing on each 
member’s judicial ideology. Then she refines her analysis by means of 
the strategic model, which refines the attitudinal model by 
recognizing that justices at least occasionally vote with an eye toward 
their colleagues’ preferences—this might represent a more formal way 
of analyzing the so-called “long game,” or at least an intermediate-
term perspective. Professor Scherer applies her approach not only to 
 
17. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2681; Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2658. 
18. Robert F. Nagel, Same-Sex Marriage, Federalism, and Judicial 
Supremacy, 64 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1119 (2014). 
19. Nancy Scherer, Viewing the Supreme Court’s Marriage Cases Through 
the Lens of Political Science, 64 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1131 (2014). 
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Windsor and Perry, the marriage cases, but also to Craig v. Boren,20 
the case that established intermediate scrutiny as the standard of 
review in cases involving gender-based classifications. 
In the last paper in the first group, Susan J. Becker addresses the 
role of the judiciary and explains why court rulings that uphold a 
right to same-sex marriage reflect an appropriate use of judicial 
independence rather than a usurpation of power that properly belongs 
to the political branches or to the people as a whole.21 
The next three papers address the nature of the family and its 
implications for judicial decision making. Maggie Gallagher and 
William C. Duncan criticize the Windsor opinion’s equal protection 
analysis, which emphasizes the absence of a legitimate governmental 
interest underlying DOMA.22 Instead, these authors urge that differing 
views about families are sincerely held and do not reflect illegitimate 
animus. 
Next, Frances Goldscheider, a prominent demographer, applies 
the tools of her field to analyzing same-sex relationships.23 In 
particular, she examines long-term trends in household composition 
and warns against inferring overly broad generalizations about the 
nature of families from romanticized images of the past and 
misleading portraits of stable, two-parent households in which 
husbands and fathers went off to work to support the family while 
wives and mothers stayed home to raise the children and take care of 
domestic chores. 
Helen M. Alvaré closes the second set of papers by examining the 
role of children in the development of family law.24 In particular, 
Professor Alvaré contends that constitutionalizing a right to same-sex 
marriage changes the law’s focus from imposing and enforcing duties 
on adults toward children toward granting rights to adults that might 
only indirectly benefit children. 
The third set of papers directly addresses equal protection in the 
marriage context. Andrew Koppelman contends that Windsor, despite 
 
20. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
21. Susan J. Becker, The Evolution Toward Judicial Independence in the 
Continuing Quest for LGBT Equality, 64 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 863 
(2014). 
22. Maggie Gallagher & William C. Duncan, The Kennedy Doctrine: Moral 
Disagreement and the “Bare Desire to Harm,” 64 Case W. Res. L. 
Rev. 949 (2014). 
23. Frances Goldscheider, Rescuing the Family from the Homophobes and 
Antifeminists: Analyzing the Recently Developed and Already Eroding 
“Traditional” Notions of Family and Gender, 64 Case W. Res. L. 
Rev. 1029 (2014). 
24. Helen M. Alvaré, Same-Sex Marriage and the “Reconceiving” of 
Children, 64 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 829 (2014). 
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the absence of discussion of the standard of review, can be understood 
as part of the Supreme Court’s larger body of equality jurisprudence.25 
He explains that the Windsor Court did not treat DOMA as a statute 
that classified on the basis of sexual orientation but rather as one that 
drew a line based on sex: the statute classified on the basis of the sex 
of the parties to the marriage. Professor Koppelman goes on to defend 
the Court’s silence on the standard of review by situating Windsor in 
the context of other cases that did not rely on an explicit level of 
scrutiny but instead invalidated laws or policies that rested on no 
more than a bare desire to harm. Then he argues for an expansive 
definition of “bare desire to harm” that includes extreme indifference 
toward the interests of a group that is singled out for extraordinarily 
harsh treatment. 
By contrast, Sherif Girgis criticizes Windsor for having arbitrarily 
defined marriage under the Constitution when the document was 
silent on the subject.26 Girgis finds that Justice Alito’s dissenting 
opinion was the most persuasive of all the approaches taken in the 
case. He contends that the federalism challenge to DOMA was 
misguided, rejects the argument that the federal statute improperly 
classified on the basis of either sexual orientation or sex, and that the 
majority’s approach was no more defensible than that taken in 
Lochner v. New York.27 
The third paper in this group serves as a bridge between the 
discussions of equality and federalism. Nancy C. Marcus explains why 
the brief discussion of state power in Windsor should not be 
understood as supporting federalism-based objections to bans on 
same-sex marriage.28 While conceding that Edith Windsor had not 
asserted a federalism claim, Professor Marcus analyzes why Justice 
Kennedy’s federalism discussion ultimately makes the ruling one 
about equal liberty rather than state autonomy. 
The last two papers from the symposium involve state authority. 
First, Ernest A. Young maintains that Windsor can and should be 
understood as a federalism ruling but that the decision so understood 
does not necessarily give the states carte blanche to define marriage: 
any state definition of marriage still must satisfy the requirements of 
the Equal Protection Clause, an issue that was irrelevant to the 
 
25. Andrew Koppelman, Beyond Levels of Scrutiny: Windsor and “Bare 
Desire to Harm,” 64 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1045 (2014). 
26. Sherif Girgis, Windsor: Lochnerizing on Marriage?, 64 Case W. Res. 
L. Rev. 971 (2014). 
27. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
28. Nancy C. Marcus, When Quacking Like a Duck Is Really a Swan Song 
in Disguise: How Windsor’s State Powers Analysis Sets the Stage for the 
Demise of Federalism-Based Marriage Discrimination, 64 Case W. 
Res. L. Rev. 1073 (2014). 
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resolution of the dispute over DOMA’s validity.29 Professor Young 
goes on to make a broader point, that the Constitution does not give 
the federal government express or implied authority to define 
marriage. 
Second, Robin Fretwell Wilson examines the tension between 
recognizing both a right to same-sex marriage and space for 
religiously motivated opponents of such a right.30 She notes that the 
political process sought to accommodate both sets of interests in those 
jurisdictions where same-sex marriage was adopted by legislation or 
ballot initiative but that recognizing same-sex marriage through the 
judicial process might make accommodation more complicated. But 
while recognizing that approval of same-sex marriage by legislation or 
initiative might be less likely in those states that have not already 
taken this path, she urges that the political process nevertheless holds 
greater promise of reconciling the competing interests than does 
litigation. 
The final paper in this issue was not actually presented at the 
symposium but reflects much of the program’s content. Ronald Kahn, 
a prominent political scientist who specializes in the Supreme Court 
and constitutional theory, attended all of the conference presentations 
and wrote a synthetic essay that might be understood as the 
comprehensive work of a discussant.31 However, Professor Kahn seeks 
to go beyond summarizing and synthesizing the various papers and 
also tries to explain how and why a purportedly conservative Supreme 
Court rendered decisions in both Windsor and Perry that advanced 
gay rights without finally resolving whether the Constitution affords a 
right to same-sex marriage. That question remains on the table, but 
these rulings will play a prominent role in litigation and political 
debate in the future. 
 
 
29. Ernest A. Young, Is There a Federal Definitions Power?, 64 Case W. 
Res. L. Rev. 1269 (2014). 
30. Robin Fretwell Wilson, Marriage of Necessity: Same-Sex Marriage and 
Religious Liberty Protections, 64 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1161 (2014). 
31. Ronald Kahn, Understanding United States v. Windsor and the 
Symposium Contributions Using Unidirectional and Bidirectional 
Models of Supreme Court Decision Making, 64 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 
1293 (2014). 
